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Abstract
In the Sudano-Sahelian region, which includes South Niger, the inter-annual variability of the
rainy season is high and irrigation is scarce. As a consequence, bad rainy seasons have a massive
impact on crop yield and regularly entail food crises. Traditional insurances based on crop damage
assessment are not available because of asymmetric information and high transaction costs com-
pared to the value of production. We assess the risk mitigation capacity of an alternative form of
insurance which has been implemented in India since 2003: insurance based on a weather index.
We compare the capacity of various weather indices to increase utility of a representative risk-averse
farmer. We show the importance of using plot-level yield data rather than village averages, which
bias results. We also illustrate the need for out-of-sample estimations in order to avoid overﬁtting.
Even with the appropriate index and assuming a substantial risk aversion, we ﬁnd a limited gain of
implementing insurance, roughly corresponding to, or slightly exceeding, the cost of implementing
such insurances observed in India. However, when we treat separately the plots with and without
fertilizers, we show that the beneﬁt of insurance is higher in the former case. This suggests that
insurances may increase the use of risk-increasing inputs like fertilizers and improved cultivars,
hence average yields, which are very low in the region.
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JEL Codes: G21, O12, Q12, Q18, Q54.
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11 Introduction
Since the 1970s, Sahel, including Niger, has suﬀered from severe droughts which have triggered im-
portant food crises (in particular in 1973, 1984 and 1991, and more recently in 2005, 2009 and 2010).
To quote the UNDP 2008 Human Development Report, “During 2004 and 2005 the implications of
these underlying vulnerabilities were powerfully demonstrated by a climate shock, with an early end
to rains and widespread locust damage” (UNDP, 2008, chapter 2).
Traditional agricultural insurance, based on damage assessment cannot eﬃciently shelter farmers
because they suﬀer from an information asymmetry between the farmer and the insurer, creating
moral hazard situations and thus a need for costly damage assessment. An emerging alternative is
insurance based on a weather index, which is used as a proxy for crop yield. In such a scheme, the
farmer, in a given geographic area, pays an insurance premium every year, and receives an indemnity
if the weather index of this area falls below a determined level (the strike). Index-based insurance
does not suﬀer from the two above-mentioned shortcomings: the weather index provides an objective,
and relatively inexpensive, proxy of crop damages. However, its weakness is the basis risk, i.e., the
imperfect correlation between the weather index and the yields of farmers contracting the insurance.
The basis risk can be considered as the sum of two risks: ﬁrst, the risk resulting from the index not
being a perfect predictor of yield in general (the model basis risk). Second, the spatial basis risk: the
index may not capture the weather eﬀectively experienced by the farmer; all the more that the farmer
is far from the weather station(s) that provide data on which index is calculated.
Very few articles in peer reviewed journals have investigated the impact of crop insurance based
on weather index in developing or transition countries (Berg et al., 2009 in Burkina Faso, Breustedt
et al., 2008 in Ukraine, Chantarat et al., 2008 in Kenya, Molini et al., 2008 in Ghana and Zant, 2008
in India). Ex-post studies (Hill and Viceisza, 2010; Cole et al. 2009; Gine and Yang, 2009 and Gine,
Townsend, and Vickery 2008) are also quite limited due to the recent development of such products.
However, many recent reports and working papers inquired such topic (Hellmut et al., 2009; Hazell et
al., 2010 that exhaustively lists recent index insurance programmes and Leblois and Quirion, 2010),
one even only concerns West Africa (DeBock, 2010).
This article aims at quantifying the beneﬁt, more precisely the risk pooling capacity, of a rainfall
index-based insurance. We take beneﬁt of a recent database of plot-level yield observations matched
with a high density rain gauge network. We show that using a plot-level yield distribution improves
the reliability of the estimates, compared to using village yield averages. We also demonstrate, in
this particular case, the necessity to run out-of-sample estimations of the insurance impact in order to
control for overﬁtting. Finally, the database allows us to distinguish between traditional and intensiﬁed
plots and to test whether the insurance may encourage growers to use more fertilisers.
The rest of the article is organised as follows: we ﬁrst describe the data and methods (section 2),
then the results (section 3), and a ﬁnal fourth section concludes.
2 Data and method
2.1 Study area
Niger is the third producer of millet in the world, succeeding to India and Nigeria. Millet covers more
than 70% of its cultivation surface dedicated to cereal (FAO, 2010) and is almost only produced for
internal consumption. The prevalence of millet, especially the traditional Haini Kiere cultivar, the
2one studied in this article, is due to its resistance to drought. Nevertheless, the dryness of the region,
in a context of largely non-irrigated agriculture, suggests that water availability is one of the major
factors limiting millet yields.
We study the Niamey squared degree area, because it is equipped with an exceptionally high
density network of meteorological stations. Such infrastructure is needed in a region where spatial
variability of rainfall is signiﬁcantly high. We also dispose of six years (2004-2009) of yields and other
precise agronomic data in ten villages. Yield observations have been collected by Agrhymet for a
minimum of 30 growers in each village. Every plot is situated at less than 3 kilometres away from
the nearest meteorological station, which is likely to limit the spatial basis risk mentioned above. In
2004, all plots were cultivated under traditional technical itineraries. In particular, very few mineral
fertilizers, chemical herbicides or pesticides were used. From 2005 onwards, growers have continued
to follow this traditional technical itinerary on a ﬁrst plot but have freely received mineral fertilisers
for applications in a second plot together with agronomical and technical advices from surveyors.
Figure 1: Rain gauges (all dots) and inquired villages (circled in black) network across Niamey Squared
Degree.
Table 1 displays the summary statistics of the ﬁrst plots, i.e. on which the traditional itinerary
is followed, that includes 29% of organic fertilization and 11% of the growers sample using either
only mineral or both organic and mineral fertilisers together. There is a high annual variability of
yields across villages (CV1=.4). Intra-village annual yield variation is however also quite signiﬁcant
(CV=.35), inducing a likely basis risk. It is due to a signiﬁcant occurrence of idiosyncratic shocks, for
a large part explained by insects ravages that account for more than 80% of all surveyed non-water-
related damages2 that hit 50% of the whole surveyed growers sample.
Table 1: Summary statistics: regular plots (2004-2009)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Farm Yields (kg/ha) 606.39 395.25 0 3 100 1 616
On-farm income (FCFA/ha)3 106 919.85 69 297.14 0 565 421.19 1 616
Organic fertilization (1 if yes) 0.29 . 0 1 1 616
Mineral fertilization (1 if yes) 0.05 . 0 1 1 616
Both fertilization (1 if yes) 0.06 . 0 1 1 616
2 Authors calculations, cf. section 2.3
1 Coeﬃcient of variation: std. dev. on mean.
2 Their occurrence is not signiﬁcantly correlated with rainfall during the cropping season.
32.2 Indemnity schedule
Insurance indemnities are triggered by low values of an underlying index that is supposed to explain
yield variation. The indemnity is a step-wise linear function of the index with 3 parameters: the strike
(S), i.e. the threshold triggering indemnity; the maximum indemnity (M) and λ, the slope-related
parameter. When λ equals one, the indemnity is either M (when the index falls below the strike level)
or 0. The strike represents the level at which the meteorological factor becomes limiting. We thus
have the following indemniﬁcation function depending on x, the meteorological index realisation:
I(S,M,λ,x) =

   
   
M, if x ≤ λ.S
S−x
S−λ.S, if λ.S < x < S
0, if x ≥ S
(1)
2.3 Index choice
We ﬁrst review diﬀerent indices that could be used in a weather-index insurance, from the simplest to
more complex ones. We tested the number of big rains (deﬁned as superior to 15 and 20 mm.) often
quoted by farmers (Roncoli et al., 2002) as a good proxy of yields, the number of dry spell episodes in
the season, Eﬀective Drought Index (EDI, Byun and Wilhite, 1999) computed on a decadal basis and
the Antecedent Precipitation Index (API, Shinoda et al., 2000) calibrated on a close area with similar
characteristics than our study site (Yamagushi and Shinoda, 2002). Those indices are not presented
in the paper because they were quite poor in terms of pooling capacity.
The indices considered in the paper are listed below by increasing complexity:
The ﬁrst is the cumulative rainfall (referred to as CR in the paper) over the crop growth period
cutting oﬀ low daily precipitations (< .85 mm. following Odekunle, 2004) that are probably entirely
evaporated. Using the actual sowing date to determine the beginning of the crop growth period in
an insurance contract is diﬃcult because it cannot be observed costlessly by the insurer. Thus we
compare two growth phase schedules (the one observed referred to as obs and the one simulated
following Sivakumar, 1988 rainy season criteria, deﬁning the beginning and the end of the growing
season; it is referred to as siva in the paper).
We then consider an improvement (referred to as BCR) of each of those simple indices by bounding
daily rainfall at 30 mm. corresponding to an excess of water that is not used by the crop.
Table 2: Summary statistics: growing season rainfall indices (2004-2009)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
CRobs (mm.) 480.36 91.70 263.816 735.89 1616
BCRobs (mm.) 422.77 71.58 262.199 574.062 1616
CRsiva (mm.) 458.60 121.14 61.47 685.20 1616
BCRsiva (mm.) 404.61 103.90 61.47 565.47 1616
WACRsiva 277.83 74.86 33.54 453.57 1616
WABCRsiva 244.62 63.89 33.54 365.54 1616
A further complexiﬁcation is to distinguish various phases during the crop growth period in the
calculation of the index. Hence we use a weighted average of crop growth phases cumulative rainfall
following Alhassane (1999) and Dancette (1983) weighting factors on the simulated crop growth phase.
The indices are referred to as WACR when daily rainfall is not bounded and WABCR when it is. Table
2 displays the descriptive statistics of the above-mentioned indices over the study period.
42.4 Parameter optimization
We used a grid optimization process to maximize the objective function. The literature brought
multiple diﬀerent objective functions such as the semi variance (or downside risk as used in Vedenov
and Barnett, 2004) or the mean-variance criterion. The former only takes risk into account, without
considering the average consumption level. It is thus useful in order to calibrate an insurance contract
but insuﬃcient for assessing growers utility gain from insurance when considering its implementation
costs. The mean-variance criterion accounts for both the consumption level and the risk, but it
weights risk with an ad-hoc parameter. We ﬁnally retained the power or Constant Relative Risk
Aversion (CRRA) utility function in order to compute the certain equivalent income (CEI) and value
overall insurance gain. Power utility functions have the advantage to facilitate comparison for diﬀerent
risk aversions. CRRA appears appropriate to describe farmers’ behaviours according to Chavas and
Holt, 1996 or Pope and Just, 1991. We thus consider the following objective function:
CEI(Y ) =
 
(1 − ρ) × E
 (W0 + Y )(1−ρ)
(1 − ρ)
   1
1−ρ
− W0 (2)
Y is the yield distribution, W0 the initial wealth (representing oﬀ- and non-farm revenues, about 40
to 60% of total revenues according to Abdoulaye and Sanders, 2006) and ρ the relative risk aversion
parameter.
W0 lowers the gain from insurance in term of certain equivalent income by increasing the certain
part of total income. We set W0 at a third of the average yield (216 kg of millet); lower than
the rate proposed by Abdoulaye and Sanders, 2006, since those revenues probably also show some
uncertainty. We tested a range of values for the relative risk aversion parameter from .5 to 4. This
range encompasses the values usually used in the development economics literature (Coble et al., 2004;
Wang et al., 2004; Carter et al., 2007 and Fafchamps, 2003; see Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008 for
a review of econometric studies that estimates this parameter). A relative risk aversion of 4 may
seem high but empirical estimates of relative risk aversion indicate a wide variation across individuals;
therefore, if insurance is not compulsory, only the most risk-averse farmers are likely to be insured
(Gollier, 2004).
We used yields (in kg per ha) as income variable for each observed plot regrouping the 10 villages
during 4 consecutive years. Since the use of costly inputs such as mineral fertilisers is very limited4
and because a major part of the harvest is used for self consumption, with limited associated price risk,
yield in kg/ha is considered a satisfying proxy for on-farm revenue. The insurance contract parameters
S, M and λ are optimized in order to maximize the certain equivalent income of equation (2) with the
following income after insurance:









Yi is the income after indemniﬁcation, Y the income before insurance, P the premium, I the
indemnity and x the rainfall index realisations associated with each plot. A loading factor is deﬁned as
a percentage of total indemniﬁcations on the whole period (ﬁxed at 10% following a private experiment
that took place in India, cf. section 3.4) and a transaction cost for each indemniﬁcation is ﬁxed
exogenously to one percent of the average yield.
4 Plots with encouragement to fertilize use as well as on-farm income will be considered in the section 3.3.
53 Results
For the ﬁrst two parts of this section we will only consider regular plots (921 observations), on which
traditional technical itineraries are followed, the last will compare diﬀerent technical itineraries for the
2005-2009 sub-period for which data for both plots are available.
3.1 Plot-level vs. aggregated data
Calibration on the whole sample allows taking intra-village yield variation into consideration, which
is rarely the case in such studies due to a lack of plot level data. In tables 3, 4, and 5 we present
for each index the average grower’s gain from insurance in certain equivalent income, respectively for.
We estimate the optimal calibration of contract parameters, taking the whole sample into account in
the ﬁrst place (Table 3). Then we calibrated parameters of the insurance policy on the village average
yields (Table 4) and we ﬁnally calibrate them on the village average yields and test them on the whole
sample (Table 5).
Table 3: Average income gain of index insurance calibrated on the whole sample
ρ = .5 ρ = 1 ρ = 2 ρ = 3 ρ = 4
CEI gain of CRobs 0.00% 0.24% 1.11% 2.61% 4.70%
CEI gain of BCRobs 0.00% 0.34% 1.63% 3.48% 5.80%
CEI gain of CRsiva 0.00% 0.34% 1.47% 3.00% 4.91%
CEI gain of BCRsiva 0.00% 0.33% 1.75% 3.76% 6.44%
CEI gain of WACRsiva 0.00% 0.46% 1.98% 3.95% 6.40%
CEI gain of WABCRsiva 0.00% 0.46% 1.98% 3.95% 6.40%
Table 4: Average income gain of index insurance calibrated on village average yields values
ρ = .5 ρ = 1 ρ = 2 ρ = 3 ρ = 4
CEI gain of CRobs ins. 0.00% 0.24% 1.17% 2.68% 4.70%
CEI gain of BCRobs ins. 0.00% 0.28% 1.49% 3.18% 5.39%
CEI gain of CRsiva ins. 0.09% 0.47% 1.42% 2.55% 4.48%
CEI gain of BCRsiva ins. 0.00% 0.17% 1.22% 2.71% 4.67%
CEI gain of WACRsiva ins. 0.00% 0.40% 1.77% 3.50% 5.63%
CEI gain of WABCRsiva ins. 0.00% 0.40% 1.77% 3.50% 5.63%
Table 5: Average income gain of index insurance calibrated on village average yields values and
tested on the whole sample
ρ = .5 ρ = 1 ρ = 2 ρ = 3 ρ = 4
CEI gain of CRobs ins. . 0.23% 0.93% 1.78% 2.89%
CEI gain of BCRobs ins. . 0.32% 1.52% 3.35% 5.79%
CEI gain of CRsiva ins. -0.12% 0.18% 1.08% 2.38% -2.39%
CEI gain of BCRsiva ins. . 0.33% 1.75% 3.74% 6.18%
CEI gain of WACRsiva ins. . 0.46% 1.95% 3.83% 6.02%
CEI gain of WABCRsiva ins. . 0.46% 1.95% 3.83% 6.02%
Variations in CEI gain (compared to calibration on the whole sample)
CRobs ins. . -3.42% -15.79% -31.88% -38.48%
BCRobs ins. . -5.76% -6.50% -3.92% -0.17%
CRsiva ins. . -45.91% -26.56% -20.58% ND%
BCRsiva ins. . -0.81% 0.03% -0.54% -4.09%
WACRsiva ins. . 0.00% -1.38% -3.01% -6.08%
WABCRsiva ins. . 0.00% -1.38% -3.01% -6.08%
The ﬁrst result is that more complex indices generally lead to a larger gain: WACR provides a
6higher gain than BCR, which itself generally performs better than CR. The only exception is the
WABCR index which provides the same outcome as the WACR index.
A second result is that the insurance gain is generally higher when dealing with simulated crop
growth phase compared to observed ones. This results validate the use of simulated growth phase
for index-based insurance products in the case of photoperiodic crops. Taking the average value for
each village leads to a misestimation of insurance gain when computed with a concave utility function
that depends on income distribution and sample size. In our case a misapprehension of village yield
distribution therefore leads to a ‘bad’ calibration of insurance parameters (especially the maximum
indemniﬁcation, that is found higher when calibrating on village averages, leading to an over-insurance
situation). The presence of village yield heterogeneity within villages modiﬁes the eﬀective gain of an
insurance calibrated on village averages. We observe in Table 5 the lower gain from insurance when
it is calibrated on village average yields, stemming from the high intra-village variations of yield. The
average loss from average yield calibration is signiﬁcant (15%) but its size depends on the index and
stresses the need to calibrate insurance parameters at the plot level.
3.2 Need for cross-validation
In the previous section, we optimized the parameters and evaluated the insurance contracts on the
same data. This creates a risk of overﬁtting due to the fact that parameters will not be calibrated and
tested on the same data in an actual insurance implementation. We can identify such a phenomenon
by running a cross-validation analysis (as do Vedenov and Barnett, 2004; Berg et al., 2009). We thus
run a ‘leave one (village) out’ method, optimizing the 3 parameters of the insurance contract for each
village using data from the 9 other villages, for each of the three diﬀerent indices and on the whole
sample of growers ﬁrst plots.
Table 6: Average income gain of leave one (village) out calibration index insurance, with insurer gain
or losses.
ρ = .5 ρ = 1 ρ = 2 ρ = 3 ρ = 4
CEI gain of CRobs ins. 0.72% -0.02% -1.48% -1.95% 2.23%
Insurer gain (kg/ha) with CRobs ins. -3.55 2.01 8.03 8.42 4.28
Insurer gain (perc. of total indem.) with CRobs ins. -82.95% 18.27% 45.46% 49.88% 20.57%
CEI gain of BCRobs ins. 0.80% 0.76% 0.70% 1.47% 2.78%
Insurer gain (kg/ha) with BCRobs ins. -3.98 -0.31 3.82 5.94 5.84
Insurer gain (perc. of total indem.) with BCRobs ins. -61.75% -1.66% 18.53% 29.85% 31.12%
CEI gain of CRsiva ins. 0.69% -0.24% 0.14% 0.86% 1.59%
Insurer gain (kg/ha) with CRsiva ins. -3.83 3.17 3.80 4.05 3.66
Insurer gain (perc. of total indem.) with BCRobs ins. -57.66% 20.27% 23.16% 26.35% 26.40%
CEI gain of BCRsiva ins. 0.92% -0.22% 1.19% 2.47% 3.99%
Insurer gain (kg/ha) with BCRsiva ins. -4.96 3.96 3.18 4.36 4.63
Insurer gain (perc. of total indem.) with BCRobs ins. -73.68% 18.76% 12.18% 17.62% 19.55%
CEI gain of WACRsiva ins. 0.80% 0.05% 1.10% 1.98% 3.77%
Insurer gain (kg/ha) with WACRsiva ins. -3.98 4.11 3.97 4.79 3.09
Insurer gain (perc. of total indem.) with BCRobs ins. -61.75% 16.01% 14.01% 18.66% 12.56%
CEI gain of WABCRsiva ins. 0.00% -0.21% 0.55% 1.26% 3.17%
Insurer gain (kg/ha) with WABCRsiva ins. 0.00 5.26 5.63 6.30 4.15
Insurer gain (perc. of total indem.) with BCRobs ins. . 21.05% 20.42% 25.26% 17.39%
In the out-of-sample estimations the insurer can be better oﬀ or worse oﬀ than in the corresponding
contract optimized with the in-sample method5. Table 6 shows the gain in CEI when the insurer can
5 This is also the case in Berg et al. (2009, Fig. 4)
7Table 7: Average income gain of leave one (village) out calibration index insurance, with equal redistri-
bution across growers of residual gains or losses from the charging rate (10% of total indemniﬁcation)
by the insurer.
ρ = .5 ρ = 1 ρ = 2 ρ = 3 ρ = 4
CEI gain of CRobs ins. -0.02% 0.16% 0.15% 0.21% 3.06%
CEI gain of BCRobs ins. -0.06% 0.31% 1.15% 2.69% 4.27%
CEI gain of CRsiva ins. -0.14% 0.10% 0.69% 1.65% 2.46%
CEI gain of BCRsiva ins. -0.13% 0.17% 1.33% 3.05% 4.82%
CEI gain of WACRsiva ins. -0.06% 0.37% 1.39% 2.67% 4.01%
CEI gain of WABCRsiva ins. 0.00% 0.36% 1.29% 2.46% 3.84%
Loss in CEI gain (compared to the in-sample calibration)
CRobs ins. . -32.13% -86.83% -92.08% -34.92%
BCRobs ins. . -9.44% -21.79% -10.27% -13.10%
CRsiva ins. . -71.07% -54.45% -50.82% -57.54%
BCRsiva ins. . -49.20% -23.66% -18.90% -25.11%
WACRsiva ins. . -19.00% -29.90% -32.27% -37.45%
WABCRsiva ins. . -20.30% -35.00% -37.79% -39.99%
either endure losses or beneﬁts, due to the miscalibration that arises from the fact that insurance
is assessed and calibrated on diﬀerent datasets. It is thus important to keep in mind that in a
real insurance project, either the insurer or the growers would suﬀer from this (partly unavoidable)
miscalibration. In our case study, calibrating insurance parameters on the nine other villages leads,
in most of the cases, to higher beneﬁt for the insurer.
Table 7 shows the insurance gain in out-of-sample with a redistribution to growers of insurer proﬁt
(losses) that are superior (inferior) to the 10% charging rate we ﬁxed in the previous sections. It allows
the comparison with in-sample calibration estimates. The beneﬁt of insurance for growers drops by 9
to 92%, with an average of 38%, when keeping artiﬁcially the insurer out-of-sample gain equal to the
in-sample case. The ranking of the indices is also changed: while BCRsiva is still better than CRsiva,
it is now generally also better than the more complex indices WACRsiva and WABCRsiva.
3.3 Potential intensiﬁcation due to insurance
As pointed out by Zant (2008), our ex ante approach does not take into account the potential intensi-
ﬁcation due to insurance supply. Indeed, many agricultural inputs, especially fertilisers, increase the
average yield but also the risk. If the rainy season is bad, the farmer still has to pay for the fertilisers
even though the increase in yield will be very limited or even nil. The literature on micro-insurance
suggests that the supply of mitigating risk products could increase the incentive to use more intensive
production, directly by lowering the level of risk faced by growers (Hill, 2010), or indirectly thanks to
a higher credit supply at a lower rate (Dercon and Christiaensen, 2007).
To address the ﬁrst point we use additional data concerning ‘encouragement’ plots: where more
inputs (micro-dose fertilization) are used because they were freely allocated by surveyors. Each grower
has a ‘regular’ plot and an ‘encouragement’ plot, the latter being only available for the 2005-2009
period. Our hypothesis is the following: since the cost of a bad rainy season is higher for intensiﬁed
production, insurance gain should be also higher. In such a case insurance should foster intensiﬁcation
and therefore bring a higher gain than with an exogenous level of fertilisers.
Table 8 displays the summary statistics of the indices over the sub-period considered in this
section. We value production at the annual average market price of millet in Niamey, taken from
8Table 8: Summary statistics: all plots (2005-2009)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Farm Yields (kg/ha) 583.39 379.81 0 3 300 2 632
On-farm income (FCFA) 101 900.38 69 498.52 -5 013.55 592 400 2 632
CRobs (mm.) 476.70 95.97 293.37 735.89 2 632
BCRobs (mm.) 423.70 74.37 281.15 574.06 2 632
CRsiva (mm.) 457.87 127.31 61.47 685.20 2 632
BCRsiva (mm.) 404.69 105.19 61.47 565.47 2 632
WACRsiva 280.36 80.32 33.54 453.57 2 632
WABCRsiva 245.24 67.92 33.54 365.54 2 632
Among which
Regular plots:
Farm Yields (kg/ha) 544.27 359.64 0 3 100 1 316
On-farm income (FCFA) 98 557.72 66 446.75 0 565 421.19 1 316
Encouragement plots:
Farm Yields (kg/ha) 622.51 395.24 31 3 300 1 316
On-farm income (FCFA) 105 243.04 72 292.65 -5 013.55 592 400 1 316
SIM network6 in order to compute on-farm income for each plot. Fertilizers prices are taken from
the ‘Centrale d’Approvisionnement de la R´ epublique du Niger’ and quantities are ﬁxed to 50kg per
hectare. The beneﬁt from using fertilisers without insurance is quite low when taking the input costs
into account. Observed yields are about 14.4% higher in the plots where fertilization were encouraged.
On-farm income of plots where organic, mineral or both fertilisers were used is about 6.8% superior
in average but with higher risk compared to regular plots that were grown under traditional technical
itineraries (corresponding to a CV increase of 2.7% in yield distribution of the second plot).
Table 9: In-sample average gain of insurance depending on the index and risk aversion parameter.
ρ = .5 ρ = 1 ρ = 2 ρ = 3 ρ = 4
All sample (N=2632)
CRobs 0.00% 0.37% 1.83% 3.88% 6.45%
BCRobs 0.00% 0.40% 1.84% 3.98% 6.78%
CRsiva 0.00% 0.46% 2.05% 4.34% 7.25%
BCRsiva 0.00% 0.37% 1.90% 4.01% 6.57%
WACRsiva 0.00% 0.34% 1.86% 3.91% 6.42%
WABCRsiva 0.00% 0.34% 1.86% 3.91% 6.42%
Regular plots (N=1316)
CRobs 0.00% 0.13% 1.05% 2.27% 3.70%
BCRobs 0.00% 0.36% 1.52% 3.05% 4.90%
CRsiva 0.00% 0.35% 1.72% 3.63% 6.06%
BCRsiva 0.00% 0.54% 2.06% 4.00% 6.26%
WACRsiva 0.00% 0.34% 1.75% 3.53% 5.60%
WABCRsiva 0.00% 0.34% 1.75% 3.53% 5.60%
Encouragement plots (N=1316)
CRobs 0.00% 0.62% 2.62% 5.50% 9.04%
BCRobs 0.00% 0.44% 2.16% 4.90% 8.50%
CRsiva 0.00% 0.57% 2.39% 5.02% 8.27%
BCRsiva 0.00% 0.19% 1.73% 3.99% 6.78%
WACRsiva 0.00% 0.35% 1.96% 4.28% 7.10%
WABCRsiva 0.00% 0.35% 1.96% 4.28% 7.10%
Tables 9 displays the in-sample gain from insurance in FCFA for risk averse growers and risk neutral
insurer. Gain from insurance is higher in the encouragement plots sample, due to a greater risk in
income caused by costly input use. Figures 2 displays the CEI level of an average grower depending
6 Millet prices are the average prices of Niamey markets that are available each year; the SIM network is an integrated
information network across 6 countries in West Africa (resimao.org).
9on the risk aversion parameter and for both technical itineraries, for the CRobs index. Similar ﬁgures
for the other indices are reproduced in the Annex. Arrows shows the threshold level of risk aversion
from which it is not interesting for growers to fertilise inputs anymore. Those ﬁgures underline the
importance to take into account the higher incentive to use costly inputs when insurance is supplied.
There is indeed more growers that will undertake fertilization and use costly inputs when insurance is
supplied, modifying average yield and yield distribution. The ex post impact of insurance could thus
be signiﬁcantly higher that the one assessed ex ante.






































Unfertilized plots without insurance
Fertilized plots without insurance
Unfertilized plots with insurance
Fertilized plots with insurance
Figure 2: CEI without and with CRobs based insurance, depending on the risk aversion parameter, ρ,
and technical itineraries.
4 Conclusions
The article brings four major conclusions. First it underlines the need to use plot level data to study
and get a robust estimation of the impact of insurance. In the case of millet in South West Niger,
where intra-village yield variations are high and the causes of bad yields are numerous, the outcomes
of relatively simple indices are comparable to those of more complex ones. More speciﬁcally, the
better index (within an out-of-sample assessment) is a simple bounded cumulative rainfall over the
growing period. This conclusion is welcome since a simple index is easier to understand for growers.
Another welcome result is that indices based on a simulated sowing date perform at least as well as
those based on observed sowing dates, that would be costly to collect. Out-of-sample estimations
show that mis-calibration is a risk for both the insurer or growers. We show that for the beneﬁt from
index-based insurance to e higher than its implementation cost, a rather high risk aversion (typically
2) is required. The last two results emphasize the need for more research in order to evaluate the
potential of such products in the case of low intensiﬁcation, showed by most food crop production
systems in sub-Saharan Africa. It particularly emphasizes the need for an accurate index and precise
calibration of insurance policy parameters on observed data in the particular case of millet in Niger.
We ﬁnally show that insurance supply could foster costly input use. Even if our ex ante estimation
cannot rigorously take such impact into account, it suggests that the use of such ﬁnancial risk transfer
products should be accompanied with credit and/or input supply. As we showed, insurance outcome
is more probably to be superior to its estimated cost when taking potential intensiﬁcation into account
since the latter increases the risk taken by growers.
Acknowledgements: We thank P. Roudier for sowing dates calculations, J. Sanders for kindly
providing input price series and R. Marteau for drawing the Niamey Squared Degree map.
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